Introduction. In his recent book, Philosophical Problems of Statistical Inference (Chapter 2), Teddy
Seidenfeld presents an interesting argument which he takes as discrediting the Neyman Pearson (NP) theory of statistical inference. The statistical methods of NP theory are used widely in the sciences, more than any other theory of inference; and should these methods prove to be inadequate or misconceived, the validity of a good deal of scientific inference will be open to serious question. Thus, when a reputable philosopher of statistics concludes that NP theory is seriously inadequate as a theory of statistical inference, his argument warrants careful scrutiny. Focusing directly upon confidence intervals (and indirectly upon their corresponding hypotheses tests) Seidenfeld argues that while the 'best' NP confidence interval may be reasonable before observing the data (i.e., on the 'forward look') it may no longer be reasonable once the data is observed (i.e., on the 'backward look'). In the example Seidenfeld con-results in counterintuitive inferences. The problem stems from the fact that [Clalt] is an interval out of which a 'bite' has arbitrarily been taken, causing it to omit parameter values which it ought reasonably to include. Assuming that only a single observation is made on X, we are to provide an estimate of the unknown value of 0 by giving an interval of values in which 0 is presumed to lie. NP theory provides a rule for forming such intervals so that (1 -a) 100% of them will contain the correct value of 0. These are (1 -a) level confidence intervals. For the random variable 'Throughout, 'X' will be used to refer to the random variable being considered, and 'x' to its value.
[CIx]. Seidenfeld asks us to consider a random variable

270
with the above uniform density the 'best'2 (two-sided) (1 -a) confidence interval is defined by: X < 0 < X/a.
[CI]
For example, if X is observed to be 10 and a is set at .05, the 95% [CIJ] is [10, 200] . Seidenfeld then asks us to consider a situation in which additional information about 0 is known. In addition to knowing that 0 > 0, it is now known that there is an upper bound of 15 for 0, i.e., 0 -15. Seidenfeld claims that NP theory still recommends the same confidence interval as it did in the case where 0 was not known to be truncated, namely [ It must be stressed, however, that having seen the value x, NP theory never permits one to conclude that the specific confidence interval formed covers the true value of 0 with either (1 -a)100% probability or (1 -a)100% degree of confidence. Seidenfeld's remark seems rooted in a (not uncommon) desire for NP confidence intervals to provide something which they cannot legitimately provide; namely, a measure of the degree of probability, belief, or support that an unknown parameter value lies in a specific interval. Following Savage (1962) , the probability that a parameter lies in a specific interval may be referred to as a measure of final precision. While a measure of final precision may seem desirable, and while confidence levels are often (wrongly) interpreted as providing such a measure, no such interpretation is warranted. Admittedly, such a misinterpretation is encouraged by the word "confidence". Whenever X ? 3/4, the 95% [CIx] (for 0 truncated at 15) yields an interval in which 0 lies with probability 1. That is, the final precision of a trivial interval is 1. One is tempted to suppose, along with Seidenfeld, that in such cases [CIA] is really a 100% and not a 95% confidence interval. But this is to identify incorrectly confidence levels with measures of final precision. Even a trivial 95% [CIA] is still a 95% confidence interval. The reason is that it arose from a rule which is known to generate confidence intervals 95% of which will cover the true value of 0, regardless of what 0 is. Hence, before the data is observed it is known that there is a probability of .95 that the interval that [CIx] will generate will contain the true value of 0. This is a measure of initial precision. Once the data is known, this probability measure cannot legitimately be attached to the specific interval formed (i.e., it cannot be used as a measure of final precision). In the context of confidence intervals NP theory views
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0 not as a random variable, but as a fixed quantity; and hence, the probability that 0 is in a specific interval is always either 0 or 1! And finding the final precision to be either of these extreme values is not at all inconsistent with the initial precision being some non-extreme value between 0 and 1.
Seidenfeld's objection (pp. 56-57) says in effect: "Having seen the value x, it may be unreasonable to use (1 -a) as a measure of final precision." To this the NP theorist could reply that he never intended for a confidence level to be interpreted as a measure of final precision; and that he never attempted to supply such a measure, believing, as he does, that such measures are illegitimate. It is not the fault of NP theory that by misinterpreting confidence levels an invalid measure of final precision results. However, what really seems to be at the heart of Seidenfeld's criticism is the supposition that unless NP confidence intervals can be interpreted as providing a measure of final precision, they are inadequate for making inferences about estimates. In other words, in order for NP intervals to be useful for inference one is forced to interpret them illegitimately. This supposition is common among critics of NP theory: a theory is deemed inadequate for inference unless it can use data to assign a probability to a claim about the value of 0, i.e., unless it can provide a measure of final precision. On the basis of his criticism, Seidenfeld concludes that "the NP theory cannot serve as an adequate replacement for an inductive logic, especially for inverse inference." (p. 37) But his argument does not warrant this conclusion. All that can be concluded is that NP confidence levels do not provide measures of final precision, and thus NP confidence intervals cannot provide an inverse inference (i.e., an inference from sample data to a population parameter) of the form: the probability that 0 is in the interval [a,b] equals p, where a,b are numbers. But NP theory never claimed to provide techniques for an inverse inference of this form. The whole point of the NP program was to build a theory in which inverse inference involves not final but rather initial precision. (In the case of confidence intervals, the initial precision is the probability (before observing the data) that the confidence interval which the data will generate will contain the correct parameter value.) And Seidenfeld has not shown that the form of inference that the NP program provides is inadequate for inductive logic, unless such a logic is seen as requiring a measure of final precision, which would be to beg the question against NP theory. In my own estimation, the NP solution to the problem of inverse inference can provide an adequate inductive logic, and NP confidence intervals can be interpreted in a way which is both legitimate and useful for making inferences. But much remains to be done in setting out the logic of confidence interval estimation before this claim can be supported-a task which requires a separate paper. A NP test is a rule which designates which observations will be taken to reject the null or test hypothesis in favor of an alternative hypothesis. These observations make up the critical region, and it is specified so that there is a given probability, a, the size of the test, that the observation will fall in it if the null hypothesis is true. NP confidence intervals are intimately related to NP tests in that a confidence interval consists of those null hypotheses (concerning the value of 0) which the observed data does not reject. That is, if CT is the critical region of a test of ho: 0 = 00 with size a, then the (1 -a) confidence interval generated by x is [CIT] = {00: x ? CT}. This relationship is of interest because 'best' (uniformly most powerful) tests can be used to generate 'best' (uniformly most accurate) confidence intervals. Seidenfeld generates the two-sided interval [CIx] from the two-sided test of ho: 0 = 00 vs. hl: 0 # 00 with critical region CX = {x: (x < 0) or (x > 00) or (x/0 -< a)}. In the case where 0 is truncated from above, however, it seems that a one-sided test would generate a more appropriate confidence interval; namely, one which is one-sided.
In a two-sided interval one specifies both a lower and an upper confidence bound for the parameter 0,3 while in a one-sided interval only either an upper or a lower bound is specified. A lower bound may be of interest when 0 is the breaking strength of a metal; an upper bound when 0 is the toxicity of a drug, or the probability of some undesirable event. A good discussion of one-sided confidence intervals occurs in Lehmann (1959) . I suggest that in the situation where 0 is truncated from above, a one-sided (lower) confidence interval is called for. The one-sided test which can be used to generate such a one-sided (lower) interval is the test of h0: 0 -0o vs. hl: 0 > 00. The uniformly most powerful test of size a for these hypotheses, still assuming only one observation is to be made on X, has critical region Co = {x: x -00 (1 -a)} and the corresponding uniformly most accurate confidence interval is [CI0] = {0:0 > X/(1 -a)}. Since we are assuming that 0 is known to have an upper 3Consideration of confidence intervals for more than one parameter is omitted here as it is not relevant for the purposes of this paper. In conclusion, it is claimed that the NP theory fails on the 'after trial' analysis since the 'best' interval, based on the 'best' test can be logically trivial (for almost all of the sample space); whereas a NP inferior test and inferior interval has superior 'after-trial' consequences. (p. 58) I have already argued in Section 3 that the 'best' NP interval (for the case where 0 is truncated) is [CI] which is never logically trivial. But even if it is assumed that NP theory recommends [CIx] for this case, it seems that Seidenfeld's argument rests upon other faulty assumptions. His argument assumes that if one can find an interval other than the 'best' NP interval, and if there is any respect in which this alternative interval is preferable to the 'best' NP interval once the data is in, then it can be concluded that NP theory "fails on the 'after trial' analysis". This is false in general because the alternative interval found may be worse than the 'best' NP interval in any number of other respects, rendering it inadequate for estimating the parameter in question. No statistical inference theory pretends to provide inferences which will be seen to be best in all respects once the data is in. In suggesting 'best' inferences NP theory attempts to strike a balance among several competing criteria for inferences (e.g., size, power, bias.) (Often there is no one 'best' NP inference, but rather a number of possible inferences, each satisfying different criteria.) Thus, finding an alternative interval preferable in some respect to the 'best' NP interval does not justify Seidenfeld's conclusion that "NP theory cannot serve as an adequate replacement for an inductive logic.
. " For, [CIalt] is only superior to [CIx] with respect to Seidenfeld's criterion; it may fail miserably on other criteria rendering it unsuitable for estimating 0. One such criterion will be pointed out below.
Moreover, why should it even be supposed that satisfying Seidenfeld's criterion is a desirable thing for an interval estimate to do? Nowhere does Seidenfeld provide reasons for thinking that an interval that is certain to contain the true value of a parameter is to be avoided. By calling such intervals "trivial" he certainly makes them sound undesirable, but one could equally well (and perhaps more accurately) call them "certain" intervals. In Section 2 I suggested one reason that one might object to trivial intervals, but this was seen to be based on mistakenly supposing that a confidence level is to be a measure of final precision. Surely if an inference theory led to trivial intervals for all problems of interval esti-277 mation, that theory would be uninformative. But for certain problems of interval estimation it may very well be that an interval which is trivial for most observations is the most adequate interval, all things considered. As such, Seidenfeld has not provided grounds for his claim that consideration of [CIalt] is a more sensible interval estimate to infer than is [CIalt.] . It is preferable, in this example, to report an interval within which it is known that the parameter must lie, than to report one which wrongly suggests that the parameter value does not lie in a region somewhere in the middle of the interval. Arbitrarily taking a 'bite' out of the interval also leads to counterintuitive results in the tests which correspond to [CIalt.]. For example, the observation X = 10 would be taken to reject 00 = 10.06 but to accept both 00 = 10.04 and 00 = 15-a result which is counterintuitive. Even if Ca,t is understood as the critical region of a one-sided rather than a two-sided test, something as which it is more plausibly seen (although Seidenfeld does not claim it to be), it still is counterintuitive to accept 60ne of the 'forward looking' criteria in which Seidenfeld notes [Cla,.] [CIX] . [Clalt] avoids triviality only at the price of arbitrarily taking a 'bite' out of the trivial interval, thereby omitting parameter values which ought reasonably to be included.
In conclusion, Seidenfeld has not shown that NP theory is inadequate as a theory for inductive inference as he had claimed to.
